Sandwiched between Russia and China, Kazakhstan has no other choice, but to foster balanced relations with larger geopolitical powers who are often in conflict with one another: Russia, China, EU Countries, and the United States
The first Chinese mission to Central Asia took place in 138 BC when a military officer called Zhang Qian was sent to what was known as the Western Regions to build an alliance with the Yuezhi, nomadic pastoralists living in the area between present-day China and Kazakhstan. En route, however, he was captured by a group known as the Xiongnu, who enslaved him for 13 years before he escaped back to China. On his next trip, he was captured once more, although this time it only took him “just” two years to escape.
Upon returning to China in 125 BCE, he reported back to the emperor that the Western Regions were home to sophisticated civilizations that would welcome relations with China. The Chinese Han dynasty tradesmen subsequently began passing through the area on their way to the Middle East and Europe. This marked the beginnings of what would later be called the Silk Road, a network of Eurasian trade routes that were active for more than 1,600 years – from the middle of the second century BC to the middle of the 15th century.
Over two millennia later, China’s relations with Central Asia are once again on the up. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, they have increased immeasurably, culminating in the 2013 launch (in the Kazakh capital Astana, nowadays re-named Nur-Sultan) of the Silk Road Economic Belt, currently known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a new series of transport networks through what were once the traditional trade routes of the Western Regions.
Counterbalance to Russia’s influence
On January 25th, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the five Central Asian leaders to commemorate the 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Central Asian countries. Central Asia is today important to China for many reasons, including security interests arising from the shared border with Xinjiang, natural resources, and opportunities for foreign investors. The trade volume between China and Central Asia has increased 100 times over the past 30 years, and China is the biggest source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the region. During the summit, China announced plans to increase the trade target between China and the region to $70 billion by 2030.
Kazakhstan was a natural choice for the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative. It has rich reserves of oil and minerals, and it shares a 1,108-mile-long-border with China. The largest landlocked country in the world, it is sandwiched between China and Russia, linking the former to the Caspian Sea and by extension to Europe and the Middle East. Central Asia, which for much of Chinese history constituted a distant land, has now become its backyard.
Due to Soviet-Chinese tensions, in the second half of the twentieth century, China and Kazakhstani soviet authorities had no direct tight relations. After the fall of the Soviet Union, and since Kazakhstan became independent in 1991, though, they rapidly forged ties. China was seen as a country that could help Kazakhstan modernize its economy and counterbalance Russia’s influence. The two countries quickly resolved their border disputes and established a joint counter-terrorism initiative.
Fastest growing import-export markets
Today, Chinese-Kazakh relations are extensive. In recent years, China has overtaken Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner, becoming its fastest-growing export market and fastest-growing import market. Total bilateral trade was $22.94 billion in the first 11 months of 2021 (China exported $12.59 billion worth of goods to Kazakhstan; Kazakhstan exported $10.35 billion worth of goods to China), up 14.7% from the previous year.
Over the last five years, trade between the two countries has expanded at an average annual rate of 16 percent. China invested $19.2 billion in Kazakhstan, the world’s 9th largest 2country between 2005 and 2020; 56 Chinese-backed projects worth nearly $24.5 billion are due to be completed by 2023. The Khorgos Gateway on the Chinese-Kazakh border is the biggest dry port in the world, linking Chinese industrial hubs to European cities via rail.
Almost half of Chinese BRI-related investments and loans in Kazakhstan are in oil and natural gas projects. The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline, which opened in 2009, runs through southern Kazakhstan and terminates at Khorgos, again reducing Kazakh reliance on Russia. China has equities controlling 24 and 13 percent of Kazakhstan’s oil and gas production, while it is also the largest buyer of Kazakhstan’s uranium (Kazakhstan is the world’s leading uranium producer).
From January to November 2021, China imported four trillion tons of natural gas from Kazakhstan. It imports far more from Russia and the Middle East, but this still represents a significant figure, as it supports China’s goal of reducing its reliance on the Malacca Strait. The energy that enters China over land, rather than shipped, is more secure.
Kazakhstan is in nobody’s pocket
As the West looks to pivot away from China, it is no surprise that some are calling for Kazakhstan to do the same. This, however, is misplaced. For the historical and geopolitical reasons mentioned above, Kazakhstan and China are natural partners. More importantly, though, Kazakhstan is not as reliant on China as other BRI partners are.
Kazakhstan has witnessed a series of anti-China protests over the past decade. In 2009, following protests, the government backed down from a proposal to award one-million hectares of land to Chinese agricultural firms. In April 2016, thousands of protesters gathered to oppose amendments to Kazakhstan’s Land Code, which would have allowed foreigners to rent agricultural plots in Kazakhstan for up to 25 years. This led to fears that Chinese investors would soon buy up most of Kazakhstan’s valuable agricultural land. The plans were delayed, and the government revealed that a total of 55 projects were receiving Chinese funding through BRI channels.
The BRI does not represent the imposition of Chinese power over Kazakhstan. In fact, Kazakhstan’s debt to China has declined in recent years, and credit rating agencies show that Kazakhstan has very manageable levels of debt – 21.8% of GDP at the end of 2019 – of which debts to China only constitute 6.2 percent of the total. Rather, the BRI is a crucial part of Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy, in which it aims to develop relations with various countries, all with the goal of advancing Nurly Zhol (‘Bright Path’), Kazakhstan’s very own BRI, a $9 billion domestic economic stimulus plan to develop and modernize the country’s infrastructure.
In addition to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a customs union that aims to promote trade between Central Asia and Russia. It is also a member of Western-led security organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – Eurasia’s answer to NATO.
This dizzying array of acronyms reflects the imperatives of the country’s multi-vector foreign policy: Kazakhstan needs to maintain its political autonomy by balancing relations with larger states who are often in conflict with one another: principally Russia, China, EU countries, and the United States.
A bridge between civilizations
Kazakhstan’s neutral and balanced foreign policy has become trickier due to recent developments. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the increased tensions between China and the West following Covid-19, and following the disputes over Taiwan, have led to demands for countries to choose sides. Kazakhstan, though, is in nobody’s pocket.
Many countries around the world continue to maintain relations with Russia despite the sanctions; Not all countries can choose sides in wars that don’t involve them. As China and Kazakhstan mark the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the countries with President Xi Jinping’s first visit abroad since the start of the pandemic, to Nur Sultan the capital city of Kazakhstan, any calls for Kazakhstan to distance itself from China would be even more misplaced.
Despite disagreements, the world continues to trade with China and engage with it diplomatically. It would be hypocritical to expect Kazakhstan to behave differently, particularly as its relationship with China, managed independently and as part of its multi-vector foreign policy, is so crucial for its development. Kazakhstan should continue to be what its geography encourages it to be: a bridge between civilizations.
